

## TRAGIC CONFLICT AND THE VIRTUES OF INTELLIGENCE: NOTES AND DEFINITIONS

Dr. Dwight Goodyear

### Tragic Conflict

We hear the words ‘tragedy’ and ‘tragic’ quite often. A car accident is said to be tragic and the death of someone is a tragedy. It seems that in common parlance a tragedy is a terrible state of affairs. But there are other ways to think about tragedy that derive from the genre of tragic literature and the life experiences these works reflect. One popular way is to think of a tragedy as a situation in which there is a certain type of conflict. This type of conflict can be tersely defined as follows: *An unavoidable conflict of momentous values and/or obligations in which some values and/or obligations are sacrificed causing suffering* (cf. Sophocles’ *Antigone*).

Tragic conflict assumes a vision of morality that can be referred to as pluralistic. Sidney Hook describes this vision:

The “good” which confronts us in any situation, actual or planned, is never single or complete. Clinging to each possible resolution is a *cluster of goods*. Each one of these goods has a legitimate claim. But they cannot all be realized at the same time and in the same degree. (1995, 149)

William James gives some examples:

Every end of desire that presents itself appears exclusive of some other end of desire. Shall a man drink and smoke, *or* keep his nerves in condition?—he cannot do both. Shall he follow his fancy for Amelia, *or* for Henrietta?—both cannot be the choice of his heart. Shall he have the dear old republican party, *or* a spirit of unsophistication in public affairs?—he cannot have both, etc. So the ethical philosopher’s demand for the right scale of subordination in ideals is the fruit of an altogether practical need. Some part of the ideal must be butchered, and he needs to know which part. It is a tragic situation, and no mere speculative conundrum, with which he has to deal. (McDermott, 622)

### Why Should We Care About Tragic Conflict?

(1) If we see moral conflict mediation as one of the most important functions our mind can perform, and many serious moral conflicts are tragic, then tragic conflict should be recognized and addressed. One might say that it is precisely *because* tragic conflicts involve necessary sacrifice that we should try to reduce the costs of conflict whenever possible.

(2) A sense of the tragic can help us avoid dogmatism and enter into genuine negotiation. For if one affirms the reality of tragic conflict then one affirms that all the values involved in a conflict might be valuable and perhaps justified. And such an affirmation seems to be a necessary condition for honestly negotiating. After all, one does not honestly negotiate and mediate if one assumes in advance that some position is the only correct one. Rather, one should assume that moral conflicts of goods and rights are not necessarily contradictions and that *all* the candidates in a morally problematic situation possess some desirable traits. Of course, many people approach moral conflicts *dogmatically*, that is, with the belief that certain values are the only *real* values. Such people will see many values in a morally problematic situation as *apparently* good

or right. But dogmatism can prevent a fair weighing of the views involved in conflict. It can prevent one from taking into account options that can lead to more inclusive resolutions. And it contradicts any experimental approach to tragedy that takes each situation as a unique challenge.

(3) The intelligence limitations dramatically revealed in tragic conflict can help make moral inquiry more sensitive to the complexities of conflict. All too often we think we can quickly fix things and bring about resolutions with the application of some prefixed idea or theory. This simple problem solving mentality can prevent us from detecting simplifications, misunderstandings, and exclusions that we would ordinarily miss. If this is the case then we should take the limits revealed in tragic conflict seriously in order to do justice to the possibilities of moral inquiry.

### **How Can We Address Tragic Conflict?**

In 1960 Sidney Hook wrote an essay entitled “Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life”. Hook’s twenty-two page essay argues that American pragmatism is consistent with a sense of the tragic. Here is his summary:

I am more interested here in stating a position than establishing it. As I understand the pragmatic perspective on life, it is an attempt to make it possible for men to live in a world of inescapable tragedy—a tragedy that flows from the conflict of moral ideals—without lamentation, defiance, or make-believe. According to this perspective even in the best of human worlds there will be tragedy—tragedy perhaps without bloodshed, but certainly not without tears. It focuses its analysis on problems of normative social inquiry in order to reduce the costs of tragedy. Its view of man is therefore melioristic, not optimistic. (22)

Hook argues that the best way to approach tragic conflict is with a melioristic attitude and intelligent social inquiry. But what do these terms mean?

### **Meliorism**

Meliorism is essentially an attitude that sees improvement as neither necessary (optimism) nor impossible (pessimism). We do more justice to the facts of experience when we assert that *some* conditions of the world’s improvement exist and that progress becomes more probable as preventing conditions become less probable. In the face of tragic conflict, the pessimist may not try hard enough and the optimist may not face the facts. Of course, this means we may fail and that there may be no power waiting to catch us if we fall. But this is exactly what allows meliorists to be *heroic* in the face of tragedy. According to James, heroism implies effort, risk, and some ideal worth fighting for. Meliorists want to improve conditions in order to reduce the costs of tragic conflict so they have an ideal. But attached to the realization of this ideal will be effort and the risk of failure.

### **Intelligence**

John Dewey argued that intelligence is essentially a certain type of inquiry with a certain type of pattern. He defines this pattern as follows:

Observation of the detailed makeup of the situation; analysis into its diverse factors; clarification of what is obscure; discounting of the more insistent and vivid traits; tracing the consequences of the various modes of action that present themselves; regarding the

decision reached as hypothetical and tentative until the supposed consequences which led to its adoption have been squared with actual consequences. This inquiry is intelligence. (MW12:173)

The purpose of intelligent inquiry is to liberate us from certain habits:

The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to project new and more complex ends—to free experience from routine and caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action—that is the pragmatic lesson. (MW10:45)

Unfortunately, it is not enough to understand the pattern conceptually. For one also needs certain habits or virtues if it is to be actualized. Dewey describes these virtues with subtle differences and similarities. There are, however, a core set which he discusses quite often:

- Being conscientious or being interested in finding out what the actual good of a certain situation is
- Maintaining a bias toward fairness and objectivity when judging and evaluating conflicting values and opinions
- Seeking the good of a situation with others whenever possible
- Being emotionally sensitive and especially sympathetic to the values and feelings of those in the situation
- Carefully reflecting upon the relevant aspects of the situation
- Exercising one's imagination to see new possibilities and have a sense of the situation as a whole
- Being willing to change our beliefs in light of consequences and learn from the past

It would be a serious mistake to believe that these virtues function in isolation from one another. In fact, it is just the reverse: they work together in an indefinite number of ways and in doing so make moral deliberation more insightful and productive. But how exactly can these virtues help us reduce the necessary costs of tragic conflict?

### **Tragic Conflict and the Virtues of Intelligence**

#### ***Conscientiousness***

In “Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life” Hook asserts that the most important duty of all in a situation requiring moral decision is that of *conscientiousness*. Now some may think that conscientiousness is the habit of considering one's internal moods or sentiments. But according to Dewey this subjective slant completely misses the mark. For conscientiousness is the habit of being interested in judging the best course of action in a morally problematic situation. As Dewey says, “Modern conscientiousness contains less of the idea of intellectual accomplishment, and more the idea of interest in finding out the good in conduct” (MW5:376). Conscientiousness can also be construed as “the formed habit of bringing intelligence to bear upon the analysis of moral relations—the habit of considering what ought to be done” (EW3:364). It is crucial to understand that conscientiousness is about discovery, pursuit, and effort rather than achievement, possession, and rest. *It is always on the outlook for something better*. As such, conscientiousness is the most important of all our habits due to its power to *develop* other habits. For we will exercise our capacities if we are in the habit of being deeply concerned about what is to be done.

And we will be less inclined to act out of routine if we are interested in discovering something new. Thus conscientious people “do not allow themselves to be unduly swayed by immediate appetite and passion, nor to fall into ruts of routine behavior” (LW7:272).

Without the habit of being conscientious there can very little hope of reducing the amount of suffering in a tragic conflict. For obviously one needs to have a strong interest in discovering the most inclusive good of a situation. All too often people approach conflicts without a desire to find such a good. They simply want their way or no way at all. Conscientious people will do just the opposite: they will try as hard as possible to find resolutions that awaken the least sum of dissatisfactions.

### ***Bias Toward Objectivity***

The conscientious desire to negotiate conflict cannot be adequately expressed without an habitual bias toward objective analysis. After all, many of our moral failures stem from some one-sided bias that makes us carelessly judge a situation. It is therefore not surprising to find Dewey claiming that “conscientiousness is an analysis of the conditions under which conduct takes place, and of the action that will meet these conditions; it is a thoroughly *objective* analysis” (EW3:365). The more one develops the habit of impartial inquiry the less dogmatic one will be. For impartial inquiry means “that there is no particular end set up in advance so as to shut in the activities of observation, forming of ideas, and application” (MW12:164). Dogmatic approaches are first and foremost road blocks to inquiry: they attempt to maintain their position when confronted with counter claims or evidence and are not interested in changing or compromising. Conscientious social inquiry, on the other hand, is always on the outlook for something better and is therefore not tied down by any judgment or criterion of judgment.

Clearly this bias toward objectivity can be helpful in a tragic situation where strong feelings are bound to blind those involved to less devastating courses of action. To be sure, we are all limited to a certain number of perspectives which preclude total objectivity. But the creative seeking inherent in conscientiousness can help us widen our perspectives.

### ***Community of Inquiry***

The intelligent habit of maintaining a bias toward objectivity leads right to the habit of seeking the good of a situation with others whenever possible. This is crucial since *conflict takes place in a social context*. This context of conflict, especially when it entails conflicts between groups, classes, nations, races, and institutions, is bound to very complex. People’s backgrounds, personalities, and interests will most likely play an important role, as will economic, political, and sociological factors. The question arises: How can someone interested in reducing the consequences of tragic conflicts expect to avoid these factors in his or her own life? One good answer can be found in the notion of a community of inquiry. Cornelius Castoriadis notes that the phrase ‘not to be wise alone’ is found in Sophocles’ tragedy *Antigone* (v. 707-9). According to him the phrase expresses the fundamental maxim of democratic politics:

*Antigone* addresses itself to the problem of political action in terms which acquire their acute relevance in the democratic framework more than in any other. It exhibits the uncertainty pervading the field, it sketches the impurity of motives, it exposes the inconclusive character of the reasoning upon which we base our decisions. It shows that hubris has nothing to do with the transgression of definite norms, that it can take the form of the adamant will to apply norms, disguise itself behind noble and worthy motivations,

be they rational or pious. With its denunciation of the *mono phronein*, it formulates the fundamental maxim of democratic politics. (Castoriadis, 120)

One might say that “not to be wise alone” is also a maxim of intelligence. It arises when we recognize the complexity of the social context of conflict and especially tragic conflict. The hope is that by considering many other perspectives we can correct some of the myopias that inevitably arise despite our best intentions.

### ***Emotions***

If one is to enter into intelligent social inquiry one must develop certain sensitivities. Dewey notes that “the only guarantee of impartial, disinterested inquiry is the social sensitiveness of the inquirer to the needs and problems of those with whom he is associated” (MW12:165). And one aspect of this social sensitivity is emotional. Now some may think that intelligent action, like so many traditional philosophical views of reason, might seek to divorce itself as far as possible from emotion. But this is not the case. Indeed, Dewey claims that the “separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy” (MW14:177). But how are intelligence and emotion joined? Well, intelligent action is joined to emotion once moral inquiry occurs. For intelligence tries to mediate situations of conflict that include values that are *momentous* to those involved. Intelligent action is also joined with emotion insofar as conscientious action implies an emotional *interest* in discovering the most inclusive good of a situation. There is, however, a more important way emotional sensitivity is joined to intelligence. Consider this passage:

As the only effective thought is one fused by emotion into a dominant interest, so the only truly general, the reasonable as distinct from the merely shrewd or clever thought, is the generous thought. Sympathy widens our interest in consequences and leads us to take into account such results as affect the welfare of others; it aids us to count and weigh these consequences as counting for as much as those which touch our own honor, purse, or power. (MW5:303)

Dewey defines sympathy as the reproduction of the experience of another accompanied by the recognition of the fact that it is his experience (EW2:285). Without this reproduction and recognition we have a hard time *getting beyond our own subjective perceptions*. We get caught up in our purposes and claims and fail to humble ourselves long enough to hear other people’s views. Sympathy also enables us to perceive *the consequences of our judgments* more comprehensively. If we only count and weigh the consequences of decisions according to our welfare then most likely we will have a skewed version of the situation. But with sympathy we can hope to gain a more accurate assessment of our actions. Indeed, “sympathy is the sole means by which persons come within the range of our life” (EW2:285). Sympathetic people have the capacity to bring other people within the range of their *lives*—not just their intellect or ideas—and by doing so they are able to react in ways that are far more comprehensive. Such a capacity is crucial if one is going to make a sincere attempt to understand other people’s perspectives and react to the aftermath of tragic decision in ways that are responsible.

### ***Reflection***

Intelligent reflection demands that we reflect on the relevant aspects *of the situation* and avoid superimposing what worked in the past onto the present. Of course we can use various principles and rules as guides. But we must see them as hypotheses to be employed rather than rigid rules to be followed. Moreover, we shouldn’t assume a fixed end of inquiry. Instead, we must have ends-in-view which are ideals of what we conceive the future to be. Such ideals play a role in

orienting our inquiries and can alter as our inquiry brings new data to light. We must also be self-corrective regarding our principles, that is, we must be willing to revise or abandon a principle if the consequences to which it leads don't square with our predictions or intentions. Dewey calls this experimental form of situated reflection *the logic individualized situations*. Those who employ this logic in a tragic situation must find their way among the conflicting claims and try to give each one of them a voice. The hope is that as much as possible of each voice may be incorporated in some shared interest which is accepted because the alternatives are less satisfactory. In order to do this, they will investigate every relevant feature about it, the conditions under which it emerged, its proximate causes and consequences, the costs of gratifying it, and the available alternatives and their costs (Hook 1974, 19). Of course, such comprehensive inquiry can be difficult. Therefore in his essay "Ethics of Controversy" Hook outlines some helpful guidelines:

- (1) Nothing and no one is immune from criticism
- (2) Everyone involved in a controversy has an intellectual responsibility to inform himself of the available facts
- (3) Criticism should be directed first to policies, and against persons only when they are responsible for policies, and against their motives or purposes only when there is some independent evidence of their character
- (4) Because certain words are legally permissible, they are not therefore morally permissible
- (5) Before impugning an opponent's motives, even when they legitimately may be impugned, answer his arguments
- (6) Do not treat an opponent of a policy as if he were therefore a personal enemy of the country or a concealed enemy of democracy
- (7) Since a good cause may be defended by bad arguments, after answering the bad arguments for another's position present positive evidence of your own
- (8) Do not hesitate to admit lack of knowledge or to suspend judgment if evidence is not decisive either way
- (9) Only in pure logic and mathematics, not in human affairs, can one demonstrate that something is strictly impossible. Because something is logically possible, it is not therefore probable. "It is impossible" is a preface to an irrelevant statement about human affairs. The question is always one of the balance of probabilities. And the evidence for probabilities must include more than abstract possibilities
- (10) The cardinal sin, when we are looking for truth of fact or wisdom of policy, is refusal to discuss, or action that blocks discussion (1980, 122).

### ***Imagination***

One cannot employ the logic of individualized situations if one doesn't have a strong imagination. First, without imagination we would not be able to consider possible alternatives of action and mentally trace their consequences. In fact, Dewey defines deliberation as "a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action" (MW14:132). Now if intelligence requires deliberation, and imagination is required for deliberation, then intelligence is not possible without imagination. Second, Dewey tells us that imaginative vision "elicits the possibilities that are interwoven within the texture of the actual" (LW10:348). But if the job of intelligent action is to "grasp and realize genuine opportunity, possibility," then imagination is indispensable to intelligent action (MW14:161). And third, without imagination our intellectual analysis would have no *orientation*. For imagination is "a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole," and without a qualitative sense of the whole situation we would have no guide to our reflection (LW10:271). Of course, imagination can by no means dispense

with reflection. For visions are not understood by vision. But imaginative vision is certainly indispensable to any comprehensive assessment of a situation.

This is certainly the case when it comes to a tragic situation. For imagination enables us to *get a sense of the bigger picture* which, when it comes to tragedy, is very often exactly what people lack. Of course, to see and feel a situation as a whole is necessary if one is to better anticipate certain consequences and causes within the situation. But more importantly, imagination can prevent us from performing in an irresponsible and even cruel manner. In his essay "Intelligence and Evil in Human History" Hook writes: "We are all crueler than we know, not because we are evil, but because our senses and imagination have such a limited range". He goes on: "I am speaking now of those great ranges of cruelty in modern history, involving the fate of millions, that flow from the limitations of human imagination and sensitivity, of the cruelty men do because it is easy to stand what is out of sight, and still easier to stand what is out of mind" (1974, 29). The habit of imagining can help make us more aware of what goes on around us so we can become less inconsiderate and cruel. Without this awareness it is hard to see how we can engage in a comprehensive and conscientious investigation of a situation.

### ***Learning From the Past***

We have seen that conscientiousness is the habit of bringing intelligence to bear on moral conduct. Now this includes *past* conduct as well. To not reflect on our past moral conduct is unacceptable since "our past experiences decide along what lines the present activities of intelligence shall be directed" (EW2:112). But conscientious people never dwell on the past to live in the past. Rather, they will dwell on it to get the meaning and instruction for future action: "The person who reflects on his past action in order to get light on his future behavior is the conscientious person" (LW7:172).

What will this reflection look like when it comes to tragedy? Well, recall that a conscientious person is always trying to find the good in conduct. This good, when it comes to tragic situations, is the ideal of moral inclusivity: the satisfaction of as many demands as possible with as little sacrifice and suffering as possible. Reflection on the past will entail a comprehensive assessment of one's conduct in relation to this moral ideal.

The first level of assessment is finding out to what extent the mediation enacted reduces sacrifice and suffering. The consequences of an experiment to reduce the costs of tragic conflict are to be judged by how much outcry or satisfaction they cause. We need need to keep a sympathetic ear open for such outcry in order to make an informed judgment of the situation. In many cases the "cries of the wounded" are obvious and soon inform us that our solution didn't bring forth a satisfactory resolution (McDermott, 626). Other times, however, we fail to have an accurate sense of the situation and the effects of our actions within it. James notes that "under every system of moral rules are innumerable persons whom it weighs upon, and goods which it represses; and these are always rumbling and grumbling in the background, and ready for any issue by which they may get free" (McDermott, 624). Every system of rules that is good for someone will end up being bad for someone else. This doesn't mean we should give up. It means we should try to be that much more sensitive to those excluded and silenced voices of suffering that history all too often forgets. James notes that the course of history is nothing but the story of man's struggle to find more and more moral inclusivity. This struggle, as Hook notes, makes history an arena of moral conflict in which legitimate rights have always been sacrificed. Many of these sacrifices lie buried in the foundations of other people's lives. Therefore it is crucial that one's assessment of the past be tentative rather than final. By doing so it may be possible to embrace what Walter Kaufmann observes to be the heart of tragedy: "What

lies at the heart of it [tragedy] is the refusal to let any comfort, faith, or joy deafen our ears to the tortured cries of our brothers” (1968, 182).

But there is also a more personal assessment of a tragic situation. Recall Socrates was deemed the wisest in Athens because he knew he didn’t know anything. With this title he revealed to his fellow citizens that men can never possess the truth. In fact, those who dare to proclaim they have the truth are actually ignorant. J. Peter Euben puts the point well:

Those who do claim to “possess” it, both in the sense of exclusivity and finality, are, like the sophists, presumptively wise but actually ignorant. Knowledge is not an object that can be finished or completed. In this sense Socratic political philosophy is *praxis* rather than *poiesis*. To suppose otherwise is to embrace those tyrannical impulses that transform politics into command and obedience and wisdom into abstract knowledge. (Euben, 214)

This account has an affinity with the foregoing account of conscientiousness. We have seen that the purpose of conscientiousness is to engage in discovery, pursuit, and effort rather than achievement, possession, and rest. Indeed, “The truly conscientious person not only uses a standard in judging, but is concerned to revise and improve his standard” (LW7:273). According to Dewey, this developmental dimension of conscientiousness makes it a form of *wisdom*:

Wisdom, or (in modern phrase) conscientiousness, is the nurse of all the virtues. Our most devoted courage is in the will to know the good and the fair by unflinching attention to the painful and disagreeable. Our severest discipline in self-control is that which checks the exorbitant pretensions of an appetite by insisting upon knowing it in its true proportions. The most exacting justice is that of an intelligence which gives due weight to each desire and demand in deliberation before it is allowed to pass into overt action. That affection and wisdom lie close to each other is evidenced by our language; thoughtfulness, regard, consideration for others, recognition of others, attention to others. (MW5:364)

To become wiser would be to gain a deeper understanding of one’s capacities and the will to develop them in new directions. It is to develop *a new quality of the self* rather than to amass *a new quantity of facts*. To become wiser is, like Socrates showed, not to *possess* some *thing*: it is to realize one *lacks* moral knowledge and to understand that one must *become better* by engaging in moral deliberation:

Moral deliberation differs from other forms not as a process of forming a judgment and arriving at knowledge but in the kind of value which is thought about. The value is technical, professional, economic, etc., as long as one thinks of it as something which one can aim at and attain by way of having, *possessing*; as something to be got or to be missed. Precisely the same object will have a moral value when it is thought of as making a difference in the *self*, as determining what one will *be*, instead of merely what one will *have*. (LW7:274)

We might realize we didn’t try hard enough to be impartial, sympathetic, or imaginative. We might realize we lacked the will to involve ourselves in a community of inquiry. Or perhaps our reflections simply weren’t comprehensive or knowledgeable enough. Of course such examination is not pleasant—especially when accompanied by regret and remorse. But the suffering that may accompany such examination can, in the end, be an affective way to learn from the past. Here one thinks of the phrase *pathei mathos*—“learning through suffering”—so often found in Greek

tragedy. According to Martha Nussbaum, *pathei mathos* means that the devastation of tragedy, if one allows oneself to emotionally experience it, may bring progress along with sorrow. This progress is an increase in self-knowledge that makes one more mindful of incoherence, more respectful of the contradictory nature of experience, and more conscious of the fact that questions about morality and politics do not lend themselves to clear, terse answers (Nussbaum, 45). This humble awareness of one's capacities and one's place in the larger scheme of things can be construed as a form of wisdom.

### **Four Tragic Conflicts**

#### *Security vs. Liberty*

Americans value security and liberty. They are both highly prized goods. But immediately after 9/11 these values became factors in a tragic conflict facing Americans. The conflict was inevitable and its resolution led to both sacrifice and suffering.

#### *Safety from Terrorists vs. Respect for America*

Another conflict that Americans face as a group is the conflict between two things we value: safety from terrorists and respect for America from both citizens and non-citizens. As a result of the war on terror, these two values have inevitably clashed and the resolution has led to sacrifices of both security and respect. As a country, we needed to respond forcefully and swiftly to 9/11. There was no way around it. But no matter how we responded we were going to incur some degree of disrespect and even hatred.

#### *Status Quo vs. Dissenters*

A third post-9/11 conflict that afflicts many Americans is the conflict between, on the one hand, the status quo who see conformity to the government during war as both an obligation and a value, and, on the other hand, individuals who value dissent and feel an obligation to act in conformity with their own ideas and conscience. Those who dissented were harmed in many ways but the power of solidarity can't be underestimated in times of crisis.

#### *Passionate Commitment vs. Reflection*

The war on terror has led many Americans to become partisans, that is, to become strong, and often uncritical, supporters of a particular course of action. This should not be surprising. In emotionally charged problematic situations humans tend to act on their impulses and passions with very little consideration of alternatives. But such thoughtlessness has led to unfortunate consequences.

Key questions: To what extent have we as a country and individuals acted with intelligence with regard to these conflicts? Have our actions reduced the unfortunate consequences of the inevitable sacrifices or have our actions made the consequences worse? What could have been done differently? What can we learn and carry over to similar tragic conflicts? How can you cultivate the above virtues to be a more intelligent agent in confronting tragedy?

### **Bibliography**

- Castoriadis, Cornelius. *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy*. New York: Oxford, 1991.
- Dewey, John. *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898 (EW)*. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 5 vols. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-1972.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924 (MW)*. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 15 vols. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976-1983.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953 (LW)*. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 17 vols. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-1990.
- Euben, J. Peter. *The Tragedy of Political Theory*. Princeton: PUP, 1990.
- Goodyear, Dwight. *The Tragic Sense of Pragmatism*. Ann Arbor: UMI, 2005.
- Hook, Sidney. *Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life*. New York: Basic, 1974.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait*. New York: Prometheus, 1995.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Philosophy and Public Policy*. Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980.
- James, William. *Psychology: The Briefer Course*. New York: Dover, 2001.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Will to Believe*. New York: Dover, 1956.
- Kaufmann, Walter. *Tragedy and Philosophy*. Princeton: PUP, 1968.
- Mc Dermott, John J., ed. *The Writings of William James*. Chicago: UCP, 1977
- Nussbaum, Martha C. *The Fragility of Goodness*. Cambridge: CUP, 1986.